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Article 6

NOTES ON RECENT CASES
CHATTEL MORTGAGES.-Growing Crops: "FruitBuds"
Plaintiff sought foreclosure of a chattel mortgage given to
her by the defendant, her husband, to secure an indebtedness
to her. The mortgage ws executed on July 3, 1924, and covered the fruit crop which was to be harvested in the same year.
On November 2, 1923, the defendant had executed a chattel mortgage to one Kopp, on the same crop. Kopp intervened in the
suit claiming a superior right to the proceeds of the crop by
virtue of prior mortgage. Plaintiff contended that Kopp's purported mortgage was void under the chattel mortgage statute of
Washington which reads: "Mortgages may be made ....
upon growing crops and upon crops before the seeds thereof shall
have been sown or planted: Provided, that the mortgaging
of crops before the seed thereof shall have been sown or planted, for more than one year in advance is hereby forbidden." Sec.
3779 Rm. Comp. Stat. Kopp offered expert testimony to show
that "fruit buds", from which the crop of the following fall would
develop, had formed on the trees before the time of the execution
of the mortgage in November, thus attempting to bring his chattel mbrtgage within the "growing crop" clause of the chattel
mortgage statute. However, the court held the mortgage void.
Stuhiniller v. Stuhiniller, C. M. Kopp, interVener (Sup. Ct. Wash.
1926) 248 P. 393. The court said, "The alleged maturing of the
so-called "fruit buds" to the extent of being then possible to
differentiate from other growths upon the trees during the summer or early fall of the year preceding the year of maturing fruit
is, to our minds, only an attempted differentiating in degree of
that growth upon the trees from the other growths then going
forward upon the trees which may make for the fruit crop of
the following year. Such refinement of distinction would carry
us back indefinitely and render the statutory authorization of
the mortgaging of growing crops impractical of -determination
as to its operation

.

.

.

. We think that it cannot be held

that the commencement of the formation of the "fruit buds" in
a given year constitutes a portion of the growing of the crop
of the succeeding year any more than it can be held that the
growth of the tree in other respects during the prior years of its
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life constitutes a ipart of the period of the growing of the crop
of the succeeding years."
The court further intimated that fruit on trees cannot become
"growing crops" prior to the dormant period 'of winter, but it
did not hazard any opinion as to when that state of growth,
designated as "growing crops" in contemplation of law, would
actually commence. The controlling case cited in support of
the conclusion reached in the principal case, is Kennewick Co. v.Fry,
133 Wash. 341, 236 P. 808.
"A crop is to be considered as growing from the time the
seed is put in the ground, at which time the seed is no longer
a chattel, but becomes part. of the reality, and passes with a sale
of it. The distinction has been made that growing crops of
grain and annual productions raised by cultivation and the industry of man are personal chattels; while trees, fruit, or grass
and other natural products of the earth are parcel of the land.
But matured apples are held to be personalty." Bouvier, L. Dict.
"Growing crops" include only those which require an annual
planting or sowing, or an annual harvesting. According to the
modern view "crops" include fruit grown on trees but not the
trees themselves. Cottle v.Spitzer, 65 Calif. 456, 4 Pac. 435, 5 Am.
Rep. 305. There i's suprisingly little authority to enlighten us
on the time when fruit becomes growing crops, but the importance of judicial determination and defination in regard thereto
is evident. Although the instant case failed to fix any definite
time when fruit may be regarded as a growing crop yet it did
restrict that time until after the dormant period of winter, and
that conclusion is obviously sound.
W. L. T.
CONTRACTS-Conflicts of Law.-A resident of Mexico
brought suit in Arizona against a citizen in that state on a contract of sale of intoxicating liquors. The transaction was consummated in Mexico and neither of the parties at that time contemplated the violation of any law in the United States. Defendant sought to evade payment of the purchase price for the
alleged reason that compulsion to do so would be against the
public policy of the state and nation as evidenced by the Eighteenth Amendment and the state constitution and statutes relating to intoxicating liquors. The supreme court of Arizona
after an exhaustive study of the authorities, as disclosed by the
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reported opinion, held that such a contract, valid where made,
is by comity, valid and enforceable in that state because it is
not "inherently vicious, wicked, immoral, or so pernicious and detestable as to shock the prevailing moral sense" justifying a refusal
to extend comity for contravention of the public policy. "The
British, French or Ttalian merchant", said the court, "could scarcely
appreciate a public policy that would enable an American tourist to
plead that -his purchase of wines and liquors while enjoying the
pleasures and protection of the foreign country, were so inherently
wicked and vicious that he should not be ordered to pay therefor".
Veytia v. Alvarez. (Sup. Ct. Ariz. 1926) 247 Pac. 117.
The validity of a contract is governed by the lex loci conrtractus,
and generally if valid there, it is valid everywhere, even though, had
it been made in the state of the forum, it would have been invalid,
subject, however, to several exceptions. Carpenter Baggott Co. v.
Hanes, 167 N. C. 551, 83 S. E. 577. If a contract is valid in one
state it will, in general, not be enforced by the courts of another state,
where it is contrary to the statutes, morals, or public policy of the
latter. Bartlett v. Collins, 109 Wis. 477, 85 N. W. 703, 83 Am. St.
Rep. 928; Corbin v. Houlehan 100 Me. 246, 61 Atl. 131, 70 L. R. A.
568; Parkerv. Moore 115 Fed. 799 (U. S. C. C. A. S. C.) ; Nonotuck
Silk Co. v. Adams Express 256 Ill. 76, 99 N. E. 897; Grossman v.
Union Trust Co. 228 F. 610, Ann. Cas. 1917 B. 613; Atwater v.
Edwards Co. 147 Mo. App. 436, 126 S.W. 823. A contract, as to its
nature, obligation, and validity, is governed by the law of the place
where made, unless it is to be performed in another state, in which
case it will be governed by the law of the place of performance.
Southern Express Co. v. Gibbs, 155 Ala. 303, 46 So. 465, 18 L. R. A.
(N. S.) 874, 130 Am. St. Rep. 24. Zenatello v. Hammerstein, 231 Pa.
56, 79 Atl. 922;Fishv. Delaware, L. & W. R. Co. 211 N. Y. 374, N.
E. 661. A contract valid at place of performance will be enforced
in the state of the forum, although, the same contract made and to
be performed in the latter state would not be upheld. R. S. Oglesby
Co. v. Bank of New York, 114 Va. 663, 77 S. E. 468. The courts of
Wisconsin have recently qualified the rule to the effect that a foreign
contract is not necessarily unenforceable there because contrary to
public policy; but to be such as to not be recognized in the forum
it must be pernicious and injurious to the public welfare in the
judgment of the court. International Harvester Co. v. McAdam,
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142 Wis. 114, 124 N. W. 1042, 26 L. R. A: (N. S.) 774, 20 Ann.
Cas. 614. The later Wisconsin decision states the sound rule as well
as the modern tendency of the courts relative to recognition of rights
acquired in a foreign state, which tendency is aptly illustrated by
the opinion of Justice Cardozo in Loweks v. Standard Oil Co. 224
N. Y. 99, 120 N. E. 198, referred to in the principal case.
The instant case is authorify for the proposition that an action
to recover payment for a consummated sale of intoxicating liquors is
enforceable in the lex fori, even though prohibited there, if said.
transaction was valid in the lex loci contractus. Supporting this
conclusion is the case of Klein v. Keller 42 Old. 592, 141 Pac. 1117,
Ann. Cas. 1916 D, 1070 ;-about the only identical case reported in
the books.
W.L. T.
CORPORATIONS.-De Facto Corporations.-The Westlake Investment Company in an attempt to organize under the
laws of California failed to conform to the constitution of that
state in so far as it forbids the creation of corporations having
in their articles of incorporation a provision for stock structure
of differing par values. Such a violation of the constitution
would justify a refusal by the secretary of state to isue a certificate of incorporation. The petitioner, however, had conformed
in all ways with all the remaining requirements of law, had been
doing business in the state, had paid a corporation license tax,
and had received from the secretary of state a license to transact
business in the state for two years prior to the commencement
of this suit. When the Company applied for a license to carry on
business for the current year, the .secretary of state refused to
accept the tax and issue a license, whereupon the corporation
petitioned for a writ of mandamus to compel the secretary of
state to do so. The court held that the company became a de facto
corporation by virtue of the fact that it had attempted to organize under a valid law, under which it might have been lawfully organized, and had in good faith functioned as a corporation. A writ was directed, as prayed for, to the secretary of state
who had no authority to question the legal existence of a de facto
corporation. Westlake Inv. Co. v. Jordan, (Calif. 1926) 246 P 807.
Where there was an existing law under which an organization might have lawfully incorporated and the organization made
use of and claimed rights thereunder, and made a bona-fide attempt
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to organize but failed to record articles of incorporation in registry
of deeds and file a certified copy it was held in the recent case of
Baker v. Bates Shirt Co. 6 Fed. (2nd) 854, not to be such a colorable
compliance with the essential requirements as to establish a
de facto corporation.
Three things necessary to establish a de facto corporation,
according to the general modern rule are, (1) a valid law under
which such a corporation might be incorporated, (2) a bona-fide
attempt and colorable compliance with such law, and (3) an actual exercise of corporate rights and powers. Paragon Dist. Corp.
v. ParagonLaboratories 129 Atl. 404. The principle is too well settled to demand citation of authority that a de facto corporation
cannot exist if there is no law authorising a de jure corporation
of the character sought to be organized. The authorities are
in conflict as to whether a de facto corporation can exist under
an unconstitutional statute but the better rule, and the logical
conclusion, is that it is impossible to conceive of an attempted
compliance with and exercise of rights .under an invalid law
which is no law at all, and neither creates rights nor demands
duties. Clark v. American Cannel Coal Co. 165 Ind. 213, 73 N. E.
1083, 112 Am. St. Rep. 217.
A long list of particular defects in incorporation which have
been held not to preclude the formation of a corporation de facto
are noted in 14 C. J. 221,1N. 33, citing cases. Among these irregularities are: (1) Failure to state distinctly in the articles
the place where business is to be transacted, (2) Failure to
correctly state the objects of the corporation, (3) Failure to state
the names of the incorporators in the certificate issued by the
secretary of state, (4) Failure to state whether the stock was
asessable or non-asessable, (5) Failure properly to execute, acknowledge, or record certificate or charter, (6) Insertion of an
unauthorized provision for increase of capital stock in the articles,
(7) Inclusion in articles of more than one of the purposes
specified by statute, or of objects not covered by the statute, and
(8) Inclusion in articles of unauthorized powers or privileges.
What constitutes a "bona-fide attempt" to organize and a
"colorable compliance" with the statutory requirements is a
perplexing question which, in the last analysis, must necessarily
be left to judicial determination.
W. L. T.

